trusted-firmware-m/docs/user_guides/services/tfm_sst_integration_guide.rst

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TF-M Secure Storage Service Integration Guide
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************
Introduction
************
TF-M secure storage (SST) service implements PSA Protected Storage APIs.
The service is backed by hardware isolation of the flash access domain and, in
the current version, relies on hardware to isolate the flash area from
non-secure access. In absence of hardware level isolation, the secrecy and
integrity of data is still maintained.
The current SST service design relies on hardware abstraction level provided
by TF-M. The SST service provides a non-hierarchical storage model, as a
filesystem, where all the assets are managed by linearly indexed list of
metadata.
The SST service implements an AES-GCM based AEAD encryption policy, as a
reference, to protect data integrity and authenticity.
The design addresses the following high level requirements as well:
- **Confidentiality** - Resistance to unauthorised accesses through
hardware/software attacks.
- **Access Authentication** - Mechanism to establish requester's identity (a
non-secure entity, secure entity, or a remote server).
- **Integrity** - Resistant to tampering by either the normal users of a product,
package, or system or others with physical access to it. If the content of the
secure storage is changed maliciously, the service is able to detect it.
- **Reliability** - Resistant to power failure scenarios and incomplete write
cycles.
- **Configurability** - High level configurability to scale up/down memory
footprint to cater for a variety of devices with varying security
requirements.
- **Performance** - Optimized to be used for resource constrained devices with
very small silicon footprint, the PPA (power, performance, area) should be
optimal.
*******************************
Current SST Service Limitations
*******************************
- **Fragmentation** - The current design does not support fragmentation, as an
asset is stored in a contiguous space in a block. This means that the maximum
asset size can only be up-to a block size. Detailed information about the
maximum asset size can be found in the section `Maximum asset size` below.
Each block can potentially store multiple assets.
A delete operation implicitly moves all the assets towards the top of the block
to avoid fragmentation within block. However, this may also result in
unutilized space at the end of each block.
- **Asset size limitation** - An asset is stored in a contiguous space in a
block/sector. Hence, the maximum asset size can be up-to the size of the
data block/sector. Detailed information about the maximum asset size can be
found in the section `Maximum asset size` below.
- **Non-hierarchical storage model** - The current design uses a
non-hierarchical storage model, as a filesystem, where all the assets are
managed by a linearly indexed list of metadata. This model locates the
metadata in blocks which are always stored in the same flash location. That
increases the number of writes in a specific flash location as every change in
the storage area requires a metadata update.
- **PSA internal trusted storage API** - In the current design, the service does
not use the PSA Internal Trusted Storage API to write the rollback protection
values stored in the internal storage. The PSA Internal Trusted Storage API is
not supported in TF-M yet.
- **Protection against physical storage medium failure** - Complete handling of
inherent failures of storage mediums (e.g. bad blocks in a NAND based device)
is not supported by the current design.
- **Key diversification** - In a more robust design, each asset would be
encrypted through a different key.
- **Lifecycle management** - Currently, it does not support any subscription
based keys and certificates required in a secure lifecycle management. Hence,
an asset's validity time-stamp can not be invalidated based on the system
time.
- **Provisioning vs user/device data** - In the current design, all assets are
treated in the same manner. In an alternative design, it may be required to
create separate partitions for provisioning content and user/device generated
content. This is to allow safe update of provisioning data during firmware
updates without the need to wipe out the user/device generated data.
**************
Code Structure
**************
Secure storage service code is located in ``secure_fw/services/secure_storage/``
and is divided as follows:
- Core files
- Flash filesystem interfaces
- Flash interfaces
- Cryptographic interfaces
- Non-volatile (NV) counters interfaces
The PSA PS interfaces for SST service are located in ``interface/include``
PSA Protected Storage Interfaces
================================
The SST service exposes the following mandatory PSA PS interfaces
version 1.0:
.. code-block:: c
psa_ps_status_t psa_ps_set(psa_ps_uid_t uid, uint32_t data_length, const void *p_data, psa_ps_create_flags_t create_flags);
psa_ps_status_t psa_ps_get(psa_ps_uid_t uid, uint32_t data_offset, uint32_t data_length, void *p_data);
psa_ps_status_t psa_ps_get_info(psa_ps_uid_t uid, struct psa_ps_info_t *p_info);
psa_ps_status_t psa_ps_remove(psa_ps_uid_t uid);
uint32_t psa_ps_get_support(void);
For the moment, it does not support the extended version of those APIs.
These PSA PS interfaces and SST TF-M types are defined and documented in
``interface/include/psa_protected_storage.h`` and
``interface/include/tfm_sst_defs.h``
Core Files
==========
- ``tfm_sst_req_mngr.c`` - Contains the SST request manager implementation which
handles all requests which arrive to the service. This layer extracts the
arguments from the input and output vectors, and it calls the protected
storage layer with the provided parameters.
- ``tfm_protected_storage.c`` - Contains the TF-M protected storage API
implementations which are the entry points to the SST service.
- ``sst_object_system.c`` - Contains the object system implementation to manage
all objects in SST area.
- ``sst_object_table.c`` - Contains the object system table implementation which
complements the object system to manage all object in the SST area.
The object table has an entry for each object stored in the object system
and keeps track of its version and owner.
- ``sst_encrypted_object.c`` - Contains an implementation to manipulate
encrypted objects in the SST object system.
- ``sst_utils.c`` - Contains common and basic functionalities used across the
SST service code.
Flash Filesystem Interface
==========================
- ``flash_fs/sst_flash_fs.h`` - Abstracts the flash filesystem operations used
by the secure storage service. The purpose of this abstraction is to have the
ability to plug-in other filesystems or filesystem proxys (supplicant).
- ``flash_fs/sst_flash_fs.c`` - Contains the ``sst_flash_fs`` implementation for
the required interfaces.
- ``flash_fs/sst_flash_fs_mbloc.c`` - Contains the metadata block manipulation
functions required to implement the ``sst_flash_fs`` interfaces in
``flash_fs/sst_flash_fs.c``.
- ``flash_fs/sst_flash_fs_dbloc.c`` - Contains the data block manipulation
functions required to implement the ``sst_flash_fs`` interfaces in
``flash_fs/sst_flash_fs.c``.
The system integrator **may** replace this implementation with its own
flash filesystem implementation or filesystem proxy (supplicant).
Flash Interface
===============
- ``flash/sst_flash.h`` - Abstracts the flash operations for the secure storage
service. It also defines the block size and number of blocks used by the SST
service.
- ``flash/sst_flash.c`` - Contains the ``sst_flash`` implementation which sits
on top of CMSIS flash interface implemented by the target.
The CMSIS flash interface **must** be implemented for each target based on
its flash controller.
The block size (``SST_SECTOR_SIZE``) and number of blocks
(``SST_NBR_OF_SECTORS``) used by the secure storage area, are defined in
``flash_layout.h`` located in ``platform/ext/target/<TARGET_NAME>/partition``.
Those values **must** be defined in that header file based on flash
specifications and vendor specific considerations.
It is also required to define the ``SST_FLASH_AREA_ADDR`` which defines the
address of the first sector to be used as secure storage. The sectors reserved
to be used as secure storage **must** be contiguous sectors starting at
``SST_FLASH_AREA_ADDR``.
Cryptographic Interface
=======================
-``crypto/sst_crypto_interface.h`` - Abstracts the cryptographic
operations for the secure storage service.
- ``crypto/sst_crypto_interface.c`` - Currently, it implements the SST
service cryptographic operations using Mbed TLS library. The system integrator
**may** replace this implementation with calls to another service, crypto
library or hardware crypto unit.
Non-volatile (NV) Counters Interface
====================================
The current SST service provides rollback protection based on NV
counters.
SST defines and implements the following NV counters functionalities:
- ``nv_counters/sst_nv_counters.h`` - Abstracts SST non-volatile
counters operations. This API detaches the use of NV counters from the TF-M NV
counters implementation, provided by the platform, and provides a mechanism to
compile in a different API implementation for test purposes. A SST test suite
**may** provide its own custom implementation to be able to test different SST
service use cases.
- ``nv_counters/sst_nv_counters.c`` - Implements the SST NV counters interfaces
based on TF-M NV counters implementation provided by the platform.
*****************************
SST Service Integration Guide
*****************************
This section describes mandatory (i.e. **must** implement) or optional
(i.e. **may** implement) interfaces which the system integrator have to take
in to account in order to integrate the secure storage service in a new
platform.
Maximum Asset Size
==================
An asset is stored in a contiguous space in a block/sector. The maximum
size of an asset can be up-to the size of the data block/sector minus the object
header size (``SST_OBJECT_HEADER_SIZE``) which is defined in
``sst_object_defs.h``. The ``SST_OBJECT_HEADER_SIZE`` changes based on the
``SST_ENCRYPTION`` flag status.
Secure Storage Service Definitions
==================================
The SST service requires the following platform definitions:
- ``SST_FLASH_AREA_ADDR`` - Defines the flash address where the secure store
area starts.
- ``SST_SECTOR_SIZE`` - Defines the size of the flash sectors.
- ``SST_NBR_OF_SECTORS`` - Defines the number of sectors available for the
secure area. The sectors must be consecutive.
- ``SST_FLASH_DEV_NAME`` - Specifies the flash device used by SST to store the
data.
- ``SST_FLASH_PROGRAM_UNIT`` - Defines the smallest flash programmable unit in
bytes. Currently, SST supports 1, 2, 4 and 8.
- ``SST_MAX_ASSET_SIZE`` - Defines the maximum asset size to be stored in the
SST area. This size is used to define the temporary buffers used by SST to
read/write the asset content from/to flash. The memory used by the temporary
buffers is allocated statically as SST does not use dynamic memory allocation.
- ``SST_NUM_ASSETS`` - Defines the maximum number of assets to be stored in the
SST area. This number is used to dimension statically the object table size in
RAM (fast access) and flash (persistent storage). The memory used by the
object table is allocated statically as SST does not use dynamic memory
allocation.
Target must provide a header file, called ``flash_layout.h``, which defines the
information explained above. The defines must be named as they are specified
above.
More information about the ``flash_layout.h`` content, not SST related, is
available in :doc:`platform readme </platform/ext/readme>` along with other
platform information.
TF-M NV Counter Interface
=========================
To have a platform independent way to access the NV counters, TF-M defines a
platform NV counter interface. For API specification, please check:
``platform/include/tfm_plat_nv_counters.h``
The system integrators **may** implement this interface based on the target
capabilities and set the ``SST_ROLLBACK_PROTECTION`` flag to compile in
the rollback protection code.
Secret Platform Unique Key
==========================
The encryption policy relies on a secret hardware unique key (HUK) per device.
It is system integrator's responsibility to provide an implementation which
**must** be a non-mutable target implementation.
For API specification, please check:
``platform/include/tfm_plat_crypto_keys.h``
A stub implementation is provided in
``platform/ext/<target>/dummy_crypto_keys.c``
Flash Interface
===============
For SST service operations, a contiguous set of blocks must be earmarked for
the secure storage area. The design requires either 2 blocks, or any number of
blocks greater than or equal to 4. Total number of blocks can not be 0, 1 or 3.
This is a design choice limitation to provide power failure safe update
operations.
For API specification, please check:
``secure_fw/services/secure_storage/flash/sst_flash.h``
Non-Secure Identity Manager
===========================
TF-M core tracks the current client IDs running in the secure or non-secure
processing environment. It provides a dedicated API to retrieve the client ID
which performs the service request.
:doc:`NS client identification documentation </docs/user_guides/tfm_ns_client_identification>`
provides further details on how client identification works.
SST service uses that TF-M core API to retrieve the client ID and associate it
as the owner of an asset. Only the owner can read, write or delete that asset
based on the creation flags.
The :doc:`integration guide </docs/user_guides/tfm_integration_guide>` provides further
details of non-secure implementation requirements for TF-M.
Cryptographic Interface
=======================
The reference encryption policy is built on AES-GCM, and it **may** be replaced
by a vendor specific implementation.
The SST service abstracts all the cryptographic requirements and specifies the
required cryptographic interface in
``secure_fw/services/secure_storage/crypto/sst_crypto_interface.h``
Currently, the SST service cryptographic operations are implemented in
``secure_fw/services/secure_storage/crypto/sst_crypto_interface.c``, using
Mbed TLS library.
SST Service Features Flags
==========================
SST service defines a set of flags that can be used to compile in/out certain
SST service features. The ``CommonConfig.cmake`` file sets the default values
of those flags. However, those flags values can be overwritten by setting them
in ``platform/ext/<TARGET_NAME>.cmake`` based on the target capabilities or
needs. The list of SST services flags are:
- ``SST_ENCRYPTION``- this flag allows to enable/disable encryption
option to encrypt the secure storage data.
- ``SST_CREATE_FLASH_LAYOUT``- this flag indicates that it is required
to create a SST flash layout. If this flag is set, SST service will
generate an empty and valid SST flash layout to store assets. It will
erase all data located in the assigned SST memory area before generating
the SST layout. This flag is required to be set if the SST memory area
is located in a non-persistent memory. This flag can be set if the SST
memory area is located in a persistent memory without a valid SST flash
layout in it. That is the case when it is the first time in the device
life that the SST service is executed.
- ``SST_VALIDATE_METADATA_FROM_FLASH``- this flag allows to
enable/disable the validation mechanism to check the metadata store in flash
every time the flash data is read from flash. This validation is required
if the flash is not hardware protected against malicious writes. In case
the flash is protected against malicious writes (i.e embedded flash, etc),
this validation can be disabled in order to reduce the validation overhead.
- ``SST_ROLLBACK_PROTECTION``- this flag allows to enable/disable
rollback protection in secure storage service. This flag takes effect only
if the target has non-volatile counters and ``SST_ENCRYPTION`` flag is on.
- ``SST_RAM_FS``- this flag allows to enable/disable the use of RAM
instead of the flash to store the FS in secure storage service. This flag
is set by default in the regression tests, if it is not defined by the
platform. The SST regression tests reduce the life of the flash memory
as they write/erase multiple times in the memory.
- ``SST_TEST_NV_COUNTERS``- this flag enables the virtual
implementation of the SST NV counters interface in
``test/suites/sst/secure/nv_counters``, which emulates NV counters in
RAM, and disables the hardware implementation of NV counters provided by
the secure service. This flag is enabled by default when building the
regression tests and disabled by default otherwise. This flag can be
overridden to ``OFF`` when building the regression tests. In this case,
the SST rollback protection test suite will not be built, as it relies
on extra functionality provided by the virtual NV counters to simulate
different rollback scenarios. The remainder of the SST test suites will
run using the hardware NV counters. Please note that running the tests in
this configuration will quickly increase the hardware NV counter values,
which cannot be decreased again.
Overriding this flag from its default value of ``OFF`` when not
building the regression tests is not currently supported.
--------------
*Copyright (c) 2018-2019, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*