1332 lines
41 KiB
C
1332 lines
41 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2013-2023, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2022, NVIDIA Corporation. All rights reserved.
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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*/
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <platform_def.h>
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#include <arch.h>
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#include <arch_helpers.h>
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#include <arch_features.h>
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#include <bl31/interrupt_mgmt.h>
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#include <common/bl_common.h>
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#include <common/debug.h>
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#include <context.h>
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#include <drivers/arm/gicv3.h>
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#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
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#include <lib/el3_runtime/pubsub_events.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/amu.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/brbe.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/mpam.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/sme.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/spe.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/sve.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/sys_reg_trace.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/trbe.h>
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#include <lib/extensions/trf.h>
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#include <lib/utils.h>
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#if ENABLE_FEAT_TWED
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/* Make sure delay value fits within the range(0-15) */
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CASSERT(((TWED_DELAY & ~SCR_TWEDEL_MASK) == 0U), assert_twed_delay_value_check);
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#endif /* ENABLE_FEAT_TWED */
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static void manage_extensions_secure(cpu_context_t *ctx);
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static void setup_el1_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep)
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{
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u_register_t sctlr_elx, actlr_elx;
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/*
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* Initialise SCTLR_EL1 to the reset value corresponding to the target
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* execution state setting all fields rather than relying on the hw.
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* Some fields have architecturally UNKNOWN reset values and these are
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* set to zero.
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*
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* SCTLR.EE: Endianness is taken from the entrypoint attributes.
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*
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* SCTLR.M, SCTLR.C and SCTLR.I: These fields must be zero (as
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* required by PSCI specification)
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*/
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sctlr_elx = (EP_GET_EE(ep->h.attr) != 0U) ? SCTLR_EE_BIT : 0UL;
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if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64) {
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sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_EL1_RES1;
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} else {
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/*
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* If the target execution state is AArch32 then the following
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* fields need to be set.
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*
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* SCTRL_EL1.nTWE: Set to one so that EL0 execution of WFE
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* instructions are not trapped to EL1.
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*
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* SCTLR_EL1.nTWI: Set to one so that EL0 execution of WFI
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* instructions are not trapped to EL1.
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*
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* SCTLR_EL1.CP15BEN: Set to one to enable EL0 execution of the
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* CP15DMB, CP15DSB, and CP15ISB instructions.
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*/
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sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_AARCH32_EL1_RES1 | SCTLR_CP15BEN_BIT
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| SCTLR_NTWI_BIT | SCTLR_NTWE_BIT;
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}
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#if ERRATA_A75_764081
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/*
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* If workaround of errata 764081 for Cortex-A75 is used then set
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* SCTLR_EL1.IESB to enable Implicit Error Synchronization Barrier.
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*/
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sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_IESB_BIT;
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#endif
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/* Store the initialised SCTLR_EL1 value in the cpu_context */
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write_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL1, sctlr_elx);
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/*
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* Base the context ACTLR_EL1 on the current value, as it is
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* implementation defined. The context restore process will write
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* the value from the context to the actual register and can cause
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* problems for processor cores that don't expect certain bits to
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* be zero.
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*/
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actlr_elx = read_actlr_el1();
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write_ctx_reg((get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx)), (CTX_ACTLR_EL1), (actlr_elx));
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}
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/******************************************************************************
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* This function performs initializations that are specific to SECURE state
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* and updates the cpu context specified by 'ctx'.
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*****************************************************************************/
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static void setup_secure_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep)
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{
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u_register_t scr_el3;
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el3_state_t *state;
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state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
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scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3);
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#if defined(IMAGE_BL31) && !defined(SPD_spmd)
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/*
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* SCR_EL3.IRQ, SCR_EL3.FIQ: Enable the physical FIQ and IRQ routing as
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* indicated by the interrupt routing model for BL31.
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*/
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scr_el3 |= get_scr_el3_from_routing_model(SECURE);
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#endif
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#if !CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS || ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
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/* Get Memory Tagging Extension support level */
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unsigned int mte = get_armv8_5_mte_support();
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#endif
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/*
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* Allow access to Allocation Tags when CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS
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* is set, or when MTE is only implemented at EL0.
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*/
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#if CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS
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assert((mte == MTE_IMPLEMENTED_ELX) || (mte == MTE_IMPLEMENTED_ASY));
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scr_el3 |= SCR_ATA_BIT;
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#else
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if (mte == MTE_IMPLEMENTED_EL0) {
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scr_el3 |= SCR_ATA_BIT;
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}
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#endif /* CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS */
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/* Enable S-EL2 if the next EL is EL2 and S-EL2 is present */
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if ((GET_EL(ep->spsr) == MODE_EL2) && is_feat_sel2_supported()) {
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if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) != MODE_RW_64) {
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ERROR("S-EL2 can not be used in AArch32\n.");
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panic();
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}
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scr_el3 |= SCR_EEL2_BIT;
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}
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write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3);
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/*
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* Initialize EL1 context registers unless SPMC is running
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* at S-EL2.
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*/
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#if !SPMD_SPM_AT_SEL2
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setup_el1_context(ctx, ep);
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#endif
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manage_extensions_secure(ctx);
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}
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#if ENABLE_RME
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/******************************************************************************
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* This function performs initializations that are specific to REALM state
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* and updates the cpu context specified by 'ctx'.
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*****************************************************************************/
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static void setup_realm_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep)
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{
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u_register_t scr_el3;
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el3_state_t *state;
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state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
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scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3);
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scr_el3 |= SCR_NS_BIT | SCR_NSE_BIT;
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if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) {
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/* Enable access to the SCXTNUM_ELx registers. */
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scr_el3 |= SCR_EnSCXT_BIT;
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}
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write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3);
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}
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#endif /* ENABLE_RME */
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/******************************************************************************
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* This function performs initializations that are specific to NON-SECURE state
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* and updates the cpu context specified by 'ctx'.
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*****************************************************************************/
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static void setup_ns_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const struct entry_point_info *ep)
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{
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u_register_t scr_el3;
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el3_state_t *state;
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state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
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scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3);
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/* SCR_NS: Set the NS bit */
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scr_el3 |= SCR_NS_BIT;
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#if !CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS
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/*
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* If the pointer authentication registers aren't saved during world
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* switches the value of the registers can be leaked from the Secure to
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* the Non-secure world. To prevent this, rather than enabling pointer
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* authentication everywhere, we only enable it in the Non-secure world.
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*
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* If the Secure world wants to use pointer authentication,
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* CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS must be set to 1.
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*/
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scr_el3 |= SCR_API_BIT | SCR_APK_BIT;
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#endif /* !CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS */
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/* Allow access to Allocation Tags when MTE is implemented. */
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scr_el3 |= SCR_ATA_BIT;
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#if HANDLE_EA_EL3_FIRST_NS
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/* SCR_EL3.EA: Route External Abort and SError Interrupt to EL3. */
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scr_el3 |= SCR_EA_BIT;
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#endif
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#if RAS_TRAP_NS_ERR_REC_ACCESS
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/*
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* SCR_EL3.TERR: Trap Error record accesses. Accesses to the RAS ERR
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* and RAS ERX registers from EL1 and EL2(from any security state)
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* are trapped to EL3.
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* Set here to trap only for NS EL1/EL2
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*
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*/
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scr_el3 |= SCR_TERR_BIT;
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#endif
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if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) {
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/* Enable access to the SCXTNUM_ELx registers. */
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scr_el3 |= SCR_EnSCXT_BIT;
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}
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#ifdef IMAGE_BL31
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/*
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* SCR_EL3.IRQ, SCR_EL3.FIQ: Enable the physical FIQ and IRQ routing as
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* indicated by the interrupt routing model for BL31.
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*/
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scr_el3 |= get_scr_el3_from_routing_model(NON_SECURE);
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#endif
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write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3);
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/* Initialize EL1 context registers */
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setup_el1_context(ctx, ep);
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/* Initialize EL2 context registers */
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#if CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS
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/*
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* Initialize SCTLR_EL2 context register using Endianness value
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* taken from the entrypoint attribute.
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*/
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u_register_t sctlr_el2 = (EP_GET_EE(ep->h.attr) != 0U) ? SCTLR_EE_BIT : 0UL;
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sctlr_el2 |= SCTLR_EL2_RES1;
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write_ctx_reg(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_SCTLR_EL2,
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sctlr_el2);
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/*
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* Program the ICC_SRE_EL2 to make sure the correct bits are set
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* when restoring NS context.
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*/
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u_register_t icc_sre_el2 = ICC_SRE_DIB_BIT | ICC_SRE_DFB_BIT |
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ICC_SRE_EN_BIT | ICC_SRE_SRE_BIT;
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write_ctx_reg(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_ICC_SRE_EL2,
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icc_sre_el2);
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/*
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* Initialize MDCR_EL2.HPMN to its hardware reset value so we don't
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* throw anyone off who expects this to be sensible.
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* TODO: A similar thing happens in cm_prepare_el3_exit. They should be
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* unified with the proper PMU implementation
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*/
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u_register_t mdcr_el2 = ((read_pmcr_el0() >> PMCR_EL0_N_SHIFT) &
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PMCR_EL0_N_MASK);
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write_ctx_reg(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_MDCR_EL2, mdcr_el2);
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if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) {
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/*
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* Initialize register HCRX_EL2 with its init value.
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* As the value of HCRX_EL2 is UNKNOWN on reset, there is a
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* chance that this can lead to unexpected behavior in lower
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* ELs that have not been updated since the introduction of
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* this feature if not properly initialized, especially when
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* it comes to those bits that enable/disable traps.
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*/
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write_ctx_reg(get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx), CTX_HCRX_EL2,
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HCRX_EL2_INIT_VAL);
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}
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#endif /* CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS */
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}
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/*******************************************************************************
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* The following function performs initialization of the cpu_context 'ctx'
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* for first use that is common to all security states, and sets the
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* initial entrypoint state as specified by the entry_point_info structure.
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*
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* The EE and ST attributes are used to configure the endianness and secure
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* timer availability for the new execution context.
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******************************************************************************/
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static void setup_context_common(cpu_context_t *ctx, const entry_point_info_t *ep)
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{
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u_register_t scr_el3;
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el3_state_t *state;
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gp_regs_t *gp_regs;
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/* Clear any residual register values from the context */
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zeromem(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
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/*
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* SCR_EL3 was initialised during reset sequence in macro
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* el3_arch_init_common. This code modifies the SCR_EL3 fields that
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* affect the next EL.
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*
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* The following fields are initially set to zero and then updated to
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* the required value depending on the state of the SPSR_EL3 and the
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* Security state and entrypoint attributes of the next EL.
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*/
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scr_el3 = read_scr();
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scr_el3 &= ~(SCR_NS_BIT | SCR_RW_BIT | SCR_EA_BIT | SCR_FIQ_BIT | SCR_IRQ_BIT |
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SCR_ST_BIT | SCR_HCE_BIT | SCR_NSE_BIT);
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/*
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* SCR_EL3.RW: Set the execution state, AArch32 or AArch64, for next
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* Exception level as specified by SPSR.
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*/
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if (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64) {
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scr_el3 |= SCR_RW_BIT;
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}
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/*
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* SCR_EL3.ST: Traps Secure EL1 accesses to the Counter-timer Physical
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* Secure timer registers to EL3, from AArch64 state only, if specified
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* by the entrypoint attributes. If SEL2 is present and enabled, the ST
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* bit always behaves as 1 (i.e. secure physical timer register access
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* is not trapped)
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*/
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if (EP_GET_ST(ep->h.attr) != 0U) {
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scr_el3 |= SCR_ST_BIT;
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}
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/*
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* If FEAT_HCX is enabled, enable access to HCRX_EL2 by setting
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* SCR_EL3.HXEn.
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*/
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if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) {
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scr_el3 |= SCR_HXEn_BIT;
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}
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/*
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* If FEAT_RNG_TRAP is enabled, all reads of the RNDR and RNDRRS
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* registers are trapped to EL3.
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*/
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#if ENABLE_FEAT_RNG_TRAP
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scr_el3 |= SCR_TRNDR_BIT;
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#endif
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#if FAULT_INJECTION_SUPPORT
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/* Enable fault injection from lower ELs */
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scr_el3 |= SCR_FIEN_BIT;
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#endif
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/*
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* SCR_EL3.TCR2EN: Enable access to TCR2_ELx for AArch64 if present.
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*/
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if (is_feat_tcr2_supported() && (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64)) {
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scr_el3 |= SCR_TCR2EN_BIT;
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}
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/*
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* SCR_EL3.PIEN: Enable permission indirection and overlay
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* registers for AArch64 if present.
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*/
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if (is_feat_sxpie_supported() || is_feat_sxpoe_supported()) {
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scr_el3 |= SCR_PIEN_BIT;
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}
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/*
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* SCR_EL3.GCSEn: Enable GCS registers for AArch64 if present.
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*/
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if ((is_feat_gcs_supported()) && (GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64)) {
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scr_el3 |= SCR_GCSEn_BIT;
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}
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/*
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* CPTR_EL3 was initialized out of reset, copy that value to the
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* context register.
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*/
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write_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ctx), CTX_CPTR_EL3, read_cptr_el3());
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/*
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* SCR_EL3.HCE: Enable HVC instructions if next execution state is
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* AArch64 and next EL is EL2, or if next execution state is AArch32 and
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* next mode is Hyp.
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* SCR_EL3.FGTEn: Enable Fine Grained Virtualization Traps under the
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* same conditions as HVC instructions and when the processor supports
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* ARMv8.6-FGT.
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* SCR_EL3.ECVEn: Enable Enhanced Counter Virtualization (ECV)
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* CNTPOFF_EL2 register under the same conditions as HVC instructions
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* and when the processor supports ECV.
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*/
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if (((GET_RW(ep->spsr) == MODE_RW_64) && (GET_EL(ep->spsr) == MODE_EL2))
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|| ((GET_RW(ep->spsr) != MODE_RW_64)
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&& (GET_M32(ep->spsr) == MODE32_hyp))) {
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scr_el3 |= SCR_HCE_BIT;
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if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) {
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scr_el3 |= SCR_FGTEN_BIT;
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}
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if (is_feat_ecv_supported()) {
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scr_el3 |= SCR_ECVEN_BIT;
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}
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}
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/* Enable WFE trap delay in SCR_EL3 if supported and configured */
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if (is_feat_twed_supported()) {
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/* Set delay in SCR_EL3 */
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scr_el3 &= ~(SCR_TWEDEL_MASK << SCR_TWEDEL_SHIFT);
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scr_el3 |= ((TWED_DELAY & SCR_TWEDEL_MASK)
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<< SCR_TWEDEL_SHIFT);
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/* Enable WFE delay */
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scr_el3 |= SCR_TWEDEn_BIT;
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}
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/*
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* Populate EL3 state so that we've the right context
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* before doing ERET
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*/
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state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
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write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3);
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write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, ep->pc);
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write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SPSR_EL3, ep->spsr);
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/*
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* Store the X0-X7 value from the entrypoint into the context
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* Use memcpy as we are in control of the layout of the structures
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*/
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gp_regs = get_gpregs_ctx(ctx);
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memcpy(gp_regs, (void *)&ep->args, sizeof(aapcs64_params_t));
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}
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/*******************************************************************************
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* Context management library initialization routine. This library is used by
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* runtime services to share pointers to 'cpu_context' structures for secure
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* non-secure and realm states. Management of the structures and their associated
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* memory is not done by the context management library e.g. the PSCI service
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* manages the cpu context used for entry from and exit to the non-secure state.
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* The Secure payload dispatcher service manages the context(s) corresponding to
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* the secure state. It also uses this library to get access to the non-secure
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* state cpu context pointers.
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* Lastly, this library provides the API to make SP_EL3 point to the cpu context
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* which will be used for programming an entry into a lower EL. The same context
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* will be used to save state upon exception entry from that EL.
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******************************************************************************/
|
|
void __init cm_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* The context management library has only global data to intialize, but
|
|
* that will be done when the BSS is zeroed out.
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* This is the high-level function used to initialize the cpu_context 'ctx' for
|
|
* first use. It performs initializations that are common to all security states
|
|
* and initializations specific to the security state specified in 'ep'
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_setup_context(cpu_context_t *ctx, const entry_point_info_t *ep)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int security_state;
|
|
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform initializations that are common
|
|
* to all security states
|
|
*/
|
|
setup_context_common(ctx, ep);
|
|
|
|
security_state = GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr);
|
|
|
|
/* Perform security state specific initializations */
|
|
switch (security_state) {
|
|
case SECURE:
|
|
setup_secure_context(ctx, ep);
|
|
break;
|
|
#if ENABLE_RME
|
|
case REALM:
|
|
setup_realm_context(ctx, ep);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
case NON_SECURE:
|
|
setup_ns_context(ctx, ep);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ERROR("Invalid security state\n");
|
|
panic();
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* Enable architecture extensions on first entry to Non-secure world.
|
|
* When EL2 is implemented but unused `el2_unused` is non-zero, otherwise
|
|
* it is zero.
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
static void manage_extensions_nonsecure(bool el2_unused, cpu_context_t *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
#if IMAGE_BL31
|
|
if (is_feat_spe_supported()) {
|
|
spe_enable(el2_unused);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_amu_supported()) {
|
|
amu_enable(el2_unused, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Enable SVE and FPU/SIMD */
|
|
if (is_feat_sve_supported()) {
|
|
sve_enable(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_sme_supported()) {
|
|
sme_enable(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_mpam_supported()) {
|
|
mpam_enable(el2_unused);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_trbe_supported()) {
|
|
trbe_enable();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_brbe_supported()) {
|
|
brbe_enable();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_sys_reg_trace_supported()) {
|
|
sys_reg_trace_enable(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_trf_supported()) {
|
|
trf_enable();
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* Enable architecture extensions on first entry to Secure world.
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
static void manage_extensions_secure(cpu_context_t *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
#if IMAGE_BL31
|
|
if (is_feat_sve_supported()) {
|
|
if (ENABLE_SVE_FOR_SWD) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Enable SVE and FPU in secure context, secure manager must
|
|
* ensure that the SVE and FPU register contexts are properly
|
|
* managed.
|
|
*/
|
|
sve_enable(ctx);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Disable SVE and FPU in secure context so non-secure world
|
|
* can safely use them.
|
|
*/
|
|
sve_disable(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_sme_supported()) {
|
|
if (ENABLE_SME_FOR_SWD) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Enable SME, SVE, FPU/SIMD in secure context, secure manager
|
|
* must ensure SME, SVE, and FPU/SIMD context properly managed.
|
|
*/
|
|
sme_enable(ctx);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Disable SME, SVE, FPU/SIMD in secure context so non-secure
|
|
* world can safely use the associated registers.
|
|
*/
|
|
sme_disable(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* IMAGE_BL31 */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* The following function initializes the cpu_context for a CPU specified by
|
|
* its `cpu_idx` for first use, and sets the initial entrypoint state as
|
|
* specified by the entry_point_info structure.
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_init_context_by_index(unsigned int cpu_idx,
|
|
const entry_point_info_t *ep)
|
|
{
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx;
|
|
ctx = cm_get_context_by_index(cpu_idx, GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr));
|
|
cm_setup_context(ctx, ep);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* The following function initializes the cpu_context for the current CPU
|
|
* for first use, and sets the initial entrypoint state as specified by the
|
|
* entry_point_info structure.
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_init_my_context(const entry_point_info_t *ep)
|
|
{
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx;
|
|
ctx = cm_get_context(GET_SECURITY_STATE(ep->h.attr));
|
|
cm_setup_context(ctx, ep);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* Prepare the CPU system registers for first entry into realm, secure, or
|
|
* normal world.
|
|
*
|
|
* If execution is requested to EL2 or hyp mode, SCTLR_EL2 is initialized
|
|
* If execution is requested to non-secure EL1 or svc mode, and the CPU supports
|
|
* EL2 then EL2 is disabled by configuring all necessary EL2 registers.
|
|
* For all entries, the EL1 registers are initialized from the cpu_context
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_prepare_el3_exit(uint32_t security_state)
|
|
{
|
|
u_register_t sctlr_elx, scr_el3, mdcr_el2;
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
|
|
bool el2_unused = false;
|
|
uint64_t hcr_el2 = 0U;
|
|
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (security_state == NON_SECURE) {
|
|
uint64_t el2_implemented = el_implemented(2);
|
|
|
|
scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(get_el3state_ctx(ctx),
|
|
CTX_SCR_EL3);
|
|
|
|
if (((scr_el3 & SCR_HCE_BIT) != 0U)
|
|
|| (el2_implemented != EL_IMPL_NONE)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If context is not being used for EL2, initialize
|
|
* HCRX_EL2 with its init value here.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) {
|
|
write_hcrx_el2(HCRX_EL2_INIT_VAL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((scr_el3 & SCR_HCE_BIT) != 0U) {
|
|
/* Use SCTLR_EL1.EE value to initialise sctlr_el2 */
|
|
sctlr_elx = read_ctx_reg(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx),
|
|
CTX_SCTLR_EL1);
|
|
sctlr_elx &= SCTLR_EE_BIT;
|
|
sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_EL2_RES1;
|
|
#if ERRATA_A75_764081
|
|
/*
|
|
* If workaround of errata 764081 for Cortex-A75 is used
|
|
* then set SCTLR_EL2.IESB to enable Implicit Error
|
|
* Synchronization Barrier.
|
|
*/
|
|
sctlr_elx |= SCTLR_IESB_BIT;
|
|
#endif
|
|
write_sctlr_el2(sctlr_elx);
|
|
} else if (el2_implemented != EL_IMPL_NONE) {
|
|
el2_unused = true;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* EL2 present but unused, need to disable safely.
|
|
* SCTLR_EL2 can be ignored in this case.
|
|
*
|
|
* Set EL2 register width appropriately: Set HCR_EL2
|
|
* field to match SCR_EL3.RW.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((scr_el3 & SCR_RW_BIT) != 0U)
|
|
hcr_el2 |= HCR_RW_BIT;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For Armv8.3 pointer authentication feature, disable
|
|
* traps to EL2 when accessing key registers or using
|
|
* pointer authentication instructions from lower ELs.
|
|
*/
|
|
hcr_el2 |= (HCR_API_BIT | HCR_APK_BIT);
|
|
|
|
write_hcr_el2(hcr_el2);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise CPTR_EL2 setting all fields rather than
|
|
* relying on the hw. All fields have architecturally
|
|
* UNKNOWN reset values.
|
|
*
|
|
* CPTR_EL2.TCPAC: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL1
|
|
* accesses to the CPACR_EL1 or CPACR from both
|
|
* Execution states do not trap to EL2.
|
|
*
|
|
* CPTR_EL2.TTA: Set to zero so that Non-secure System
|
|
* register accesses to the trace registers from both
|
|
* Execution states do not trap to EL2.
|
|
* If PE trace unit System registers are not implemented
|
|
* then this bit is reserved, and must be set to zero.
|
|
*
|
|
* CPTR_EL2.TFP: Set to zero so that Non-secure accesses
|
|
* to SIMD and floating-point functionality from both
|
|
* Execution states do not trap to EL2.
|
|
*/
|
|
write_cptr_el2(CPTR_EL2_RESET_VAL &
|
|
~(CPTR_EL2_TCPAC_BIT | CPTR_EL2_TTA_BIT
|
|
| CPTR_EL2_TFP_BIT));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise CNTHCTL_EL2. All fields are
|
|
* architecturally UNKNOWN on reset and are set to zero
|
|
* except for field(s) listed below.
|
|
*
|
|
* CNTHCTL_EL2.EL1PTEN: Set to one to disable traps to
|
|
* Hyp mode of Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accesses to the
|
|
* physical timer registers.
|
|
*
|
|
* CNTHCTL_EL2.EL1PCTEN: Set to one to disable traps to
|
|
* Hyp mode of Non-secure EL0 and EL1 accesses to the
|
|
* physical counter registers.
|
|
*/
|
|
write_cnthctl_el2(CNTHCTL_RESET_VAL |
|
|
EL1PCEN_BIT | EL1PCTEN_BIT);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise CNTVOFF_EL2 to zero as it resets to an
|
|
* architecturally UNKNOWN value.
|
|
*/
|
|
write_cntvoff_el2(0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set VPIDR_EL2 and VMPIDR_EL2 to match MIDR_EL1 and
|
|
* MPIDR_EL1 respectively.
|
|
*/
|
|
write_vpidr_el2(read_midr_el1());
|
|
write_vmpidr_el2(read_mpidr_el1());
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise VTTBR_EL2. All fields are architecturally
|
|
* UNKNOWN on reset.
|
|
*
|
|
* VTTBR_EL2.VMID: Set to zero. Even though EL1&0 stage
|
|
* 2 address translation is disabled, cache maintenance
|
|
* operations depend on the VMID.
|
|
*
|
|
* VTTBR_EL2.BADDR: Set to zero as EL1&0 stage 2 address
|
|
* translation is disabled.
|
|
*/
|
|
write_vttbr_el2(VTTBR_RESET_VAL &
|
|
~((VTTBR_VMID_MASK << VTTBR_VMID_SHIFT)
|
|
| (VTTBR_BADDR_MASK << VTTBR_BADDR_SHIFT)));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise MDCR_EL2, setting all fields rather than
|
|
* relying on hw. Some fields are architecturally
|
|
* UNKNOWN on reset.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.HLP: Set to one so that event counter
|
|
* overflow, that is recorded in PMOVSCLR_EL0[0-30],
|
|
* occurs on the increment that changes
|
|
* PMEVCNTR<n>_EL0[63] from 1 to 0, when ARMv8.5-PMU is
|
|
* implemented. This bit is RES0 in versions of the
|
|
* architecture earlier than ARMv8.5, setting it to 1
|
|
* doesn't have any effect on them.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.TTRF: Set to zero so that access to Trace
|
|
* Filter Control register TRFCR_EL1 at EL1 is not
|
|
* trapped to EL2. This bit is RES0 in versions of
|
|
* the architecture earlier than ARMv8.4.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.HPMD: Set to one so that event counting is
|
|
* prohibited at EL2. This bit is RES0 in versions of
|
|
* the architecture earlier than ARMv8.1, setting it
|
|
* to 1 doesn't have any effect on them.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.TPMS: Set to zero so that accesses to
|
|
* Statistical Profiling control registers from EL1
|
|
* do not trap to EL2. This bit is RES0 when SPE is
|
|
* not implemented.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.TDRA: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL0 and
|
|
* EL1 System register accesses to the Debug ROM
|
|
* registers are not trapped to EL2.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.TDOSA: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL1
|
|
* System register accesses to the powerdown debug
|
|
* registers are not trapped to EL2.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.TDA: Set to zero so that System register
|
|
* accesses to the debug registers do not trap to EL2.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.TDE: Set to zero so that debug exceptions
|
|
* are not routed to EL2.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.HPME: Set to zero to disable EL2 Performance
|
|
* Monitors.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.TPM: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL0 and
|
|
* EL1 accesses to all Performance Monitors registers
|
|
* are not trapped to EL2.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.TPMCR: Set to zero so that Non-secure EL0
|
|
* and EL1 accesses to the PMCR_EL0 or PMCR are not
|
|
* trapped to EL2.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.HPMN: Set to value of PMCR_EL0.N which is the
|
|
* architecturally-defined reset value.
|
|
*
|
|
* MDCR_EL2.E2TB: Set to zero so that the trace Buffer
|
|
* owning exception level is NS-EL1 and, tracing is
|
|
* prohibited at NS-EL2. These bits are RES0 when
|
|
* FEAT_TRBE is not implemented.
|
|
*/
|
|
mdcr_el2 = ((MDCR_EL2_RESET_VAL | MDCR_EL2_HLP |
|
|
MDCR_EL2_HPMD) |
|
|
((read_pmcr_el0() & PMCR_EL0_N_BITS)
|
|
>> PMCR_EL0_N_SHIFT)) &
|
|
~(MDCR_EL2_TTRF | MDCR_EL2_TPMS |
|
|
MDCR_EL2_TDRA_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TDOSA_BIT |
|
|
MDCR_EL2_TDA_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TDE_BIT |
|
|
MDCR_EL2_HPME_BIT | MDCR_EL2_TPM_BIT |
|
|
MDCR_EL2_TPMCR_BIT |
|
|
MDCR_EL2_E2TB(MDCR_EL2_E2TB_EL1));
|
|
|
|
write_mdcr_el2(mdcr_el2);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise HSTR_EL2. All fields are architecturally
|
|
* UNKNOWN on reset.
|
|
*
|
|
* HSTR_EL2.T<n>: Set all these fields to zero so that
|
|
* Non-secure EL0 or EL1 accesses to System registers
|
|
* do not trap to EL2.
|
|
*/
|
|
write_hstr_el2(HSTR_EL2_RESET_VAL & ~(HSTR_EL2_T_MASK));
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise CNTHP_CTL_EL2. All fields are
|
|
* architecturally UNKNOWN on reset.
|
|
*
|
|
* CNTHP_CTL_EL2:ENABLE: Set to zero to disable the EL2
|
|
* physical timer and prevent timer interrupts.
|
|
*/
|
|
write_cnthp_ctl_el2(CNTHP_CTL_RESET_VAL &
|
|
~(CNTHP_CTL_ENABLE_BIT));
|
|
}
|
|
manage_extensions_nonsecure(el2_unused, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(security_state);
|
|
cm_set_next_eret_context(security_state);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS
|
|
|
|
static void el2_sysregs_context_save_fgt(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HDFGRTR_EL2, read_hdfgrtr_el2());
|
|
if (is_feat_amu_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HAFGRTR_EL2, read_hafgrtr_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HDFGWTR_EL2, read_hdfgwtr_el2());
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HFGITR_EL2, read_hfgitr_el2());
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HFGRTR_EL2, read_hfgrtr_el2());
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HFGWTR_EL2, read_hfgwtr_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_fgt(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
write_hdfgrtr_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HDFGRTR_EL2));
|
|
if (is_feat_amu_supported()) {
|
|
write_hafgrtr_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HAFGRTR_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
write_hdfgwtr_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HDFGWTR_EL2));
|
|
write_hfgitr_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HFGITR_EL2));
|
|
write_hfgrtr_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HFGRTR_EL2));
|
|
write_hfgwtr_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_HFGWTR_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void el2_sysregs_context_save_mpam(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
u_register_t mpam_idr = read_mpamidr_el1();
|
|
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAM2_EL2, read_mpam2_el2());
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The context registers that we intend to save would be part of the
|
|
* PE's system register frame only if MPAMIDR_EL1.HAS_HCR == 1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((mpam_idr & MPAMIDR_HAS_HCR_BIT) == 0U) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* MPAMHCR_EL2, MPAMVPMV_EL2 and MPAMVPM0_EL2 are always present if
|
|
* MPAMIDR_HAS_HCR_BIT == 1.
|
|
*/
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMHCR_EL2, read_mpamhcr_el2());
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM0_EL2, read_mpamvpm0_el2());
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPMV_EL2, read_mpamvpmv_el2());
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The number of MPAMVPM registers is implementation defined, their
|
|
* number is stored in the MPAMIDR_EL1 register.
|
|
*/
|
|
switch ((mpam_idr >> MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_SHIFT) & MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_MASK) {
|
|
case 7:
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM7_EL2, read_mpamvpm7_el2());
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 6:
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM6_EL2, read_mpamvpm6_el2());
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 5:
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM5_EL2, read_mpamvpm5_el2());
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 4:
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM4_EL2, read_mpamvpm4_el2());
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 3:
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM3_EL2, read_mpamvpm3_el2());
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 2:
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM2_EL2, read_mpamvpm2_el2());
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 1:
|
|
write_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM1_EL2, read_mpamvpm1_el2());
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void el2_sysregs_context_restore_mpam(el2_sysregs_t *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
u_register_t mpam_idr = read_mpamidr_el1();
|
|
|
|
write_mpam2_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAM2_EL2));
|
|
|
|
if ((mpam_idr & MPAMIDR_HAS_HCR_BIT) == 0U) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
write_mpamhcr_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMHCR_EL2));
|
|
write_mpamvpm0_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM0_EL2));
|
|
write_mpamvpmv_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPMV_EL2));
|
|
|
|
switch ((mpam_idr >> MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_SHIFT) & MPAMIDR_EL1_VPMR_MAX_MASK) {
|
|
case 7:
|
|
write_mpamvpm7_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM7_EL2));
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 6:
|
|
write_mpamvpm6_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM6_EL2));
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 5:
|
|
write_mpamvpm5_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM5_EL2));
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 4:
|
|
write_mpamvpm4_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM4_EL2));
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 3:
|
|
write_mpamvpm3_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM3_EL2));
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 2:
|
|
write_mpamvpm2_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM2_EL2));
|
|
__fallthrough;
|
|
case 1:
|
|
write_mpamvpm1_el2(read_ctx_reg(ctx, CTX_MPAMVPM1_EL2));
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* Save EL2 sysreg context
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_el2_sysregs_context_save(uint32_t security_state)
|
|
{
|
|
u_register_t scr_el3 = read_scr();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Always save the non-secure and realm EL2 context, only save the
|
|
* S-EL2 context if S-EL2 is enabled.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((security_state != SECURE) ||
|
|
((security_state == SECURE) && ((scr_el3 & SCR_EEL2_BIT) != 0U))) {
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx;
|
|
el2_sysregs_t *el2_sysregs_ctx;
|
|
|
|
ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
el2_sysregs_ctx = get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx);
|
|
|
|
el2_sysregs_context_save_common(el2_sysregs_ctx);
|
|
#if CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS
|
|
el2_sysregs_context_save_mte(el2_sysregs_ctx);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (is_feat_mpam_supported()) {
|
|
el2_sysregs_context_save_mpam(el2_sysregs_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) {
|
|
el2_sysregs_context_save_fgt(el2_sysregs_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_ecv_v2_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_CNTPOFF_EL2,
|
|
read_cntpoff_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_vhe_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_CONTEXTIDR_EL2,
|
|
read_contextidr_el2());
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_TTBR1_EL2,
|
|
read_ttbr1_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_ras_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_VDISR_EL2,
|
|
read_vdisr_el2());
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_VSESR_EL2,
|
|
read_vsesr_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_nv2_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_VNCR_EL2,
|
|
read_vncr_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_trf_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_TRFCR_EL2, read_trfcr_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_SCXTNUM_EL2,
|
|
read_scxtnum_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_HCRX_EL2, read_hcrx_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_feat_tcr2_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_TCR2_EL2, read_tcr2_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_feat_sxpie_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_PIRE0_EL2, read_pire0_el2());
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_PIR_EL2, read_pir_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_feat_s2pie_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_S2PIR_EL2, read_s2pir_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_feat_sxpoe_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_POR_EL2, read_por_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_feat_gcs_supported()) {
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_GCSPR_EL2, read_gcspr_el2());
|
|
write_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_GCSCR_EL2, read_gcscr_el2());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* Restore EL2 sysreg context
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(uint32_t security_state)
|
|
{
|
|
u_register_t scr_el3 = read_scr();
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Always restore the non-secure and realm EL2 context, only restore the
|
|
* S-EL2 context if S-EL2 is enabled.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((security_state != SECURE) ||
|
|
((security_state == SECURE) && ((scr_el3 & SCR_EEL2_BIT) != 0U))) {
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx;
|
|
el2_sysregs_t *el2_sysregs_ctx;
|
|
|
|
ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
el2_sysregs_ctx = get_el2_sysregs_ctx(ctx);
|
|
|
|
el2_sysregs_context_restore_common(el2_sysregs_ctx);
|
|
#if CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS
|
|
el2_sysregs_context_restore_mte(el2_sysregs_ctx);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (is_feat_mpam_supported()) {
|
|
el2_sysregs_context_restore_mpam(el2_sysregs_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_fgt_supported()) {
|
|
el2_sysregs_context_restore_fgt(el2_sysregs_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_ecv_v2_supported()) {
|
|
write_cntpoff_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx,
|
|
CTX_CNTPOFF_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_vhe_supported()) {
|
|
write_contextidr_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_CONTEXTIDR_EL2));
|
|
write_ttbr1_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_TTBR1_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_ras_supported()) {
|
|
write_vdisr_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_VDISR_EL2));
|
|
write_vsesr_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_VSESR_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_nv2_supported()) {
|
|
write_vncr_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_VNCR_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_feat_trf_supported()) {
|
|
write_trfcr_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_TRFCR_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_csv2_2_supported()) {
|
|
write_scxtnum_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx,
|
|
CTX_SCXTNUM_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_feat_hcx_supported()) {
|
|
write_hcrx_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_HCRX_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_feat_tcr2_supported()) {
|
|
write_tcr2_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_TCR2_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_feat_sxpie_supported()) {
|
|
write_pire0_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_PIRE0_EL2));
|
|
write_pir_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_PIR_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_feat_s2pie_supported()) {
|
|
write_s2pir_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_S2PIR_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_feat_sxpoe_supported()) {
|
|
write_por_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_POR_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_feat_gcs_supported()) {
|
|
write_gcscr_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_GCSCR_EL2));
|
|
write_gcspr_el2(read_ctx_reg(el2_sysregs_ctx, CTX_GCSPR_EL2));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS */
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* This function is used to exit to Non-secure world. If CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS
|
|
* is enabled, it restores EL1 and EL2 sysreg contexts instead of directly
|
|
* updating EL1 and EL2 registers. Otherwise, it calls the generic
|
|
* cm_prepare_el3_exit function.
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_prepare_el3_exit_ns(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#if CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Assert that EL2 is used. */
|
|
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
|
|
el3_state_t *state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
|
|
u_register_t scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3);
|
|
#endif
|
|
assert(((scr_el3 & SCR_HCE_BIT) != 0UL) &&
|
|
(el_implemented(2U) != EL_IMPL_NONE));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Currently some extensions are configured using
|
|
* direct register updates. Therefore, do this here
|
|
* instead of when setting up context.
|
|
*/
|
|
manage_extensions_nonsecure(0, ctx);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the NS bit to be able to access the ICC_SRE_EL2
|
|
* register when restoring context.
|
|
*/
|
|
write_scr_el3(read_scr_el3() | SCR_NS_BIT);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure the NS bit change is committed before the EL2/EL1
|
|
* state restoration.
|
|
*/
|
|
isb();
|
|
|
|
/* Restore EL2 and EL1 sysreg contexts */
|
|
cm_el2_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
|
|
cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
|
|
cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
|
|
#else
|
|
cm_prepare_el3_exit(NON_SECURE);
|
|
#endif /* CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* The next four functions are used by runtime services to save and restore
|
|
* EL1 context on the 'cpu_context' structure for the specified security
|
|
* state.
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(uint32_t security_state)
|
|
{
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx;
|
|
|
|
ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
el1_sysregs_context_save(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx));
|
|
|
|
#if IMAGE_BL31
|
|
if (security_state == SECURE)
|
|
PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_exited_secure_world);
|
|
else
|
|
PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_exited_normal_world);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(uint32_t security_state)
|
|
{
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx;
|
|
|
|
ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
el1_sysregs_context_restore(get_el1_sysregs_ctx(ctx));
|
|
|
|
#if IMAGE_BL31
|
|
if (security_state == SECURE)
|
|
PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_entering_secure_world);
|
|
else
|
|
PUBLISH_EVENT(cm_entering_normal_world);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* This function populates ELR_EL3 member of 'cpu_context' pertaining to the
|
|
* given security state with the given entrypoint
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_set_elr_el3(uint32_t security_state, uintptr_t entrypoint)
|
|
{
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx;
|
|
el3_state_t *state;
|
|
|
|
ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */
|
|
state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
|
|
write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, entrypoint);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* This function populates ELR_EL3 and SPSR_EL3 members of 'cpu_context'
|
|
* pertaining to the given security state
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_set_elr_spsr_el3(uint32_t security_state,
|
|
uintptr_t entrypoint, uint32_t spsr)
|
|
{
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx;
|
|
el3_state_t *state;
|
|
|
|
ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */
|
|
state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
|
|
write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_ELR_EL3, entrypoint);
|
|
write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SPSR_EL3, spsr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* This function updates a single bit in the SCR_EL3 member of the 'cpu_context'
|
|
* pertaining to the given security state using the value and bit position
|
|
* specified in the parameters. It preserves all other bits.
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_write_scr_el3_bit(uint32_t security_state,
|
|
uint32_t bit_pos,
|
|
uint32_t value)
|
|
{
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx;
|
|
el3_state_t *state;
|
|
u_register_t scr_el3;
|
|
|
|
ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure that the bit position is a valid one */
|
|
assert(((1UL << bit_pos) & SCR_VALID_BIT_MASK) != 0U);
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure that the 'value' is only a bit wide */
|
|
assert(value <= 1U);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the SCR_EL3 value from the cpu context, clear the desired bit
|
|
* and set it to its new value.
|
|
*/
|
|
state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
|
|
scr_el3 = read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3);
|
|
scr_el3 &= ~(1UL << bit_pos);
|
|
scr_el3 |= (u_register_t)value << bit_pos;
|
|
write_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3, scr_el3);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* This function retrieves SCR_EL3 member of 'cpu_context' pertaining to the
|
|
* given security state.
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
u_register_t cm_get_scr_el3(uint32_t security_state)
|
|
{
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx;
|
|
el3_state_t *state;
|
|
|
|
ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Populate EL3 state so that ERET jumps to the correct entry */
|
|
state = get_el3state_ctx(ctx);
|
|
return read_ctx_reg(state, CTX_SCR_EL3);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*******************************************************************************
|
|
* This function is used to program the context that's used for exception
|
|
* return. This initializes the SP_EL3 to a pointer to a 'cpu_context' set for
|
|
* the required security state
|
|
******************************************************************************/
|
|
void cm_set_next_eret_context(uint32_t security_state)
|
|
{
|
|
cpu_context_t *ctx;
|
|
|
|
ctx = cm_get_context(security_state);
|
|
assert(ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
cm_set_next_context(ctx);
|
|
}
|